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Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to conduct a market-consistent valuation of life insurance1
participating liabilities sold to a population of partially heterogeneous customers under the2
joint impact of biometric and financial risk. In particular, the heterogeneity between groups of3
policyholders stems from their offered minimum interest rate guarantees and contract maturities.4
We analyse the effects of these features on the company’s insolvency while embracing the insurer’s5
goal to achieve the same expected return for different cohorts of policyholders. Within our extensive6
numerical analyses, we determine the fair participation rates and other key figures, and discuss the7
implications for the stakeholders, taking account of various degrees of conservativeness of the insurer8
when pricing the contracts.9
Keywords: Participating life insurance; Heterogeneous policyholders; Market-consistent valuation;10
Longevity risk; Fair contract analysis11
JEL Classification: G13; G2212
1. Introduction13
This paper focuses on the market-consistent valuation of life insurance liabilities, a topic which14
has recently again attracted much attention both from academics and practitioners, see, for example,15
Sheldon and Smith (2004), Bauer et al. (2010), Broeders et al. (2013), Gambaro et al. (2019), Dorobantu16
et al. (2020) and Ghalehjooghi and Pelsser (2020). This growing interest mostly stems from the17
long-sought adoption of fair value based accounting standards in many countries, culminating with18
the full implementation of Solvency II in the European Union in 2016, see European Parliament and19
Council of the European Union (2009). According to these principles, assets and liabilities should be20
evaluated at the price, actual or hypothetical, they could be exchanged for in a liquid market. As in the21
last few decades financial markets have experienced a high volatility and permanently low (or even22
negative) interest rates, coupled with a steady increase in life expectancy, the introduction of these23
accounting standards has forced life insurers to deal with risks more carefully in valuation.24
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We propose a contingent claim model, along the lines of Briys and de Varenne (1994 1997), for the25
valuation of the equity and the liabilities of a participating life insurance company. The pioneering26
model by Briys and de Varenne (1994 1997) has been extended in several directions, e.g. by Grosen and27
Jørgensen (2002), Bernard et al. (2005), Chen and Suchanecki (2007), Cheng and Li (2018), Bacinello28
et al. (2018), Hieber et al. (2019) or Orozco-Garcia and Schmeiser (2019), just to quote a few. In most of29
these papers, fair valuation is carried out for individual life insurance contracts with the exception of30
Hieber et al. (2019), Orozco-Garcia and Schmeiser (2019) and Bacinello et al. (2018). Hieber et al. (2019)31
show that individual insurance contracts with an annual guaranteed return can be incorporated into an32
existing portfolio, resulting in no wealth transfer between two groups. Orozco-Garcia and Schmeiser33
(2019) examine whether contracts can be priced such that all the generations pay fair premiums and34
face the same level of default risk. Our paper extends Bacinello et al. (2018) who introduce biometric35
risk for a population of completely homogeneous policyholders, and analyze how this risk can be split36
into two components, namely diversifiable and systematic parts. We consider the valuation of life37
insurance participating contracts sold to a population of partially heterogeneous customers under the38
joint impact of biometric and financial risk. Here, the heterogeneity between groups of policyholders39
stems from their offered minimum interest rate guarantees and contract maturities. In this respect,40
this paper is related to Hansen and Miltersen (2002) and Burkhart (2018). Hansen and Miltersen (2002)41
deal with the case of participating life insurance contracts sold to heterogeneous customers, but do not42
take into account biometric and default risk.1 Burkhart (2018) particularly addresses surrender risk in43
the assessment of a heterogeneous insurance portfolio under Solvency II, and considers the interaction44
between minimum interest rate guarantee, surplus participation and reserving requirement.45
Analyzing customers with different minimum interest rate guarantees has some interesting46
practical implications. As a reaction to new market conditions, in particular low interest rates, one47
measure insurance companies have taken was to reduce the level of the minimum interest rate48
guarantee drastically. For example, the German Federal Ministry of Finance has gradually decreased49
the maximum technical interest rate for life insurance products over the past 26 years from 4% to 2.25%,50
then to 1.75% and currently to 0.9%, see Eling and Holder (2013). However, these adjustments are51
applied exclusively to new contracts, while older customers keep enjoying higher minimum interest52
rate guarantees. A natural question that arises is whether new customers will then be penalized and53
what measures could be taken to protect the policyholders. This problem has been widely discussed in54
public, see, for instance, Seibel (2016).55
Despite its stylized nature, this paper provides some useful insights into such and similar topics by56
developing a rather comprehensive contingent claim model that explicitly considers financial, default57
and longevity risk. We incorporate the heterogeneity of customers by dividing them into two groups.58
We model the liabilities for these two groups by addressing the insurer’s goal to protect both old and59
new customers, usually endowed with different minimum interest rate guarantees, and provide them60
with the same expected return. Alternatively, when the two groups have different contract maturities,61
the payoff of the group with the earlier maturity is structured in such a way that the other group is also62
adequately protected. We evaluate the outstanding liabilities in a market-consistent way and conduct63
an analysis of fair contracts for both specifications of the heterogeneous groups. The subject of actuarial64
fairness has been examined by several authors, see, for example, Meyers and Hoyweghen (2017)65
for a very general discussion or Knispel et al. (2011). Based on the fair combinations of parameters,66
we compute then the certainty equivalent returns, under the physical probability measure, for the67
1 Actually, Hansen and Miltersen (2002) introduce the diversifiable component of mortality.
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heterogeneous policyholders. This helps answering two questions: what are the factors determining68
the relative magnitudes of the fair participation rates? How will the benefits of the two groups, as69
measured by their certainty equivalent returns, be impacted by considering both groups as a whole?70
The main findings of the paper resulting from our numerical analysis can be summarized as71
follows: (i) The levels of the risk premium (or the degrees of prudence) arising from various longevity72
pricing assumptions play a substantial role in the magnitudes of the fair participation rates and of73
the certainty equivalent returns. (ii) Maintaining participation rates in the range 80− 100% (often74
prescribed by law and used in practice) can severely affect the insurer’s balance sheet as some portfolio75
and parameter combinations actually require smaller participation rates to ensure the fairness of76
the contracts. Remarks (i) and (ii) are consistent with the findings in Bacinello et al. (2018). (iii)77
When the two groups differ in their minimum interest rate guarantees, the group with the lower rate78
receives a higher fair participation rate. This compensation is bound to rise if the insurance company79
does not explicitly aim at providing similar returns to all policyholders, as we propose to do instead80
by modifying the payoff structure of the group with the lower minimum interest rate guarantee.81
Consequently, the difference between the certainty equivalent returns would increase as well. Further,82
when there are few policyholders holding a lower individual guarantee, their participation in the83
surplus sharing must be very high to ensure fair contracts. (iv) If the two groups differ exclusively in84
the contract maturity, the fair participation rate for the group with the longer contract duration is much85
lower. As a consequence, the certainty equivalent return behaves similarly, although to a lesser extent.86
Further, the group with the longer contract duration receives a remarkably low fair participation rate if87
its size is much lower than the other group.88
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 sets up the contract structure and89
describes the payoffs to the different customer groups and the modelling of the insurance and the90
financial risk. Section 3 focuses on the market valuation of the outstanding liabilities and explains91
how a fair contract analysis can be conducted in our framework. Section 4 is devoted to the numerical92
analysis and addresses the issue of fair pricing. Further, we find out which group benefits from93
specific portfolio compositions by comparing the certainty equivalent returns. Section 5 provides some94
concluding remarks and a short outlook on possible extensions.95
2. Model Setup96
We consider a life insurance company which consists of equity holders and two heterogeneous97
groups of policyholders. All policyholders take out their contracts at time 0. The policyholders’98
heterogeneity stems from either the offered minimum interest rate guarantees or the contract maturities.99
In group i, i = 1, 2, there are Ni(0) homogeneous policyholders, meaning that they have the same100
age, make the same initial contribution l(0) and the contracts they hold are identical. At time 0, the101
insurer’s stylized balance sheet is:102
Assets Liabilities
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The initial assets of the insurance company can be split up into three103
components: W(0) = E(0) + L1(0) + L2(0), where the premiums L1(0) = l(0)N1(0)104
and L2(0) = l(0)N2(0) are contributed by the first and the second group of policyholders,105
respectively, and the remainder E(0) by the equity holders. We denote the fraction of initial assets106
contributed by group i, i = 1, 2, by αi = Ni(0)l(0)/W(0) = Li(0)/W(0) ∈ (0, 1), and the share of107
initial assets contributed by the equity holders by e(0) := 1− α1 − α2 ∈ (0, 1).2 Note that, as we focus108
on the impact of different minimum interest rate guarantees and contract maturities, the individual109
contribution l(0) is assumed to be the same for all policyholders. The benefits for each group will be110
determined according to the initial contribution and contract provisions.111
2.1. Contract Structure112
We assume that every policyholder buys from the life insurer a participating pure endowment113
contract whose payoff is contingent on the event that the policyholder survives the contract maturity.114
We discuss two different ways the heterogeneity of groups 1 and 2 could be specified. The two groups115
differ exclusively by116
Case 1: the minimum interest rate gi ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, promised by the insurer;117
Case 2: the contract maturity date Ti, i = 1, 2.118
In both cases, the insurer provides the policyholders with some guaranteed payoff. The aggregated119
guaranteed payment to group i becomes due at the contract maturity Ti and is defined by120
Gi(Ti) := Ni(Ti)l(0)egiTi , i = 1, 2, (1)
where Ni(t) is the (random) number of surviving policyholders at time t ≥ 0 in group i.121
In the subsequent paragraphs, we specify the outstanding liabilities Li(Tj), i = 1, 2, j = 1, 2, for122
Cases 1 and 2. We note that, if there are no surviving policyholders in a group, then the insurer is free123
from any duty of payments with respect to that group. Therefore, we will set in Case 1, involving a124
common maturity T := T1 = T2 for the two groups,125
Li(T) =
Ψi if Ni(T) > 00 if Ni(T) = 0 = Ψi1{Ni(T)>0}, i = 1, 2, (2)
where 1{·} is the indicator function. Here, Ψi represents the global payment made at maturity to126
surviving policyholders in group i, i = 1, 2. Case 2 involves two contract maturities and will be treated127
separately. The amounts Ψi, i = 1, 2, depend on the guaranteed payments Gi(Ti), the value of the128
assets of the life insurance company, which is denoted by W(t) at time t ≥ 0, and on the participation129
rates δi ∈ [0, 1], according to which a share of the assets exceeding the guaranteed payoff is paid to130
surviving policyholders as a bonus.3131
Case 1. We assess the impact of different minimum interest rate guarantees. To set up this case132
recall that T1 = T2 = T and, without loss of generality, assume that g1 > g2. As a result, the payoff133
promised to the policyholders of group i, i = 1, 2, at maturity T is Gi(T) = Ni(T)l(0)egiT . Such instance134
is common to many life insurers since older products still in force often have significantly higher135
2 We assume that the insurance company issues no further debt, raises no capital and pays no dividends to the equity holders
within the time frame of interest.
3 Note that we allow for different participation rates for the two groups as the insurance company’s goal is to set these rates
so as to achieve fairness for both groups, see Section 3.
Version January 9, 2021 submitted to Risks 5 of 20
guaranteed rates than those sold more recently which were penalized by the ongoing low interest136
environment. Although in this stylized model all contracts are issued at the same date, our findings137
provide some guidance on establishing some contractual parameters, in particular the participation138
coefficients for which there is usually some discretion on the insurer’s side.139
Since several large insurance companies issuing participating contracts aim to provide the same140
(expected) rate of return to customers endowed with different minimum interest rate guarantees, we141
adjust the definition of the outstanding liabilities in order to achieve this desirable goal. Inspired by142
the model in Briys and de Varenne (1994 1997), the global payment Ψ1 in (2), relative to policyholders143




G(T) W(T) if W(T) < G(T)






where G(T) = G1(T) + G2(T) is the total guaranteed payment. The rationale behind (3) is as follows:145
if the insurance company becomes insolvent, i.e. the value of the assets at maturity W(T) is insufficient146
to cover the total guaranteed payoff G(T), the available assets are shared among the surviving147
policyholders according to a proportional splitting rule.4 This implies that the company has limited148
liability towards its customers and, in case of insolvency, nothing is left to the equity holders. If149
the assets perform moderately, i.e. G(T) ≤W(T) ≤ G(T)/ (α1 + α2), the surviving policyholders150
of group 1 receive their guaranteed payoff G1(T), but no bonus. If the assets perform well,151
i.e. G(T)/ (α1 + α2) < W(T), then policyholders of group 1 are entitled to a share of the assets W(T)152
on top of their guaranteed payments. The corresponding payoff ζ1 is specified further below.153
The global payment Ψ2 in (2) made to surviving policyholders of the group with the lower154



















The rationale behind the expression in the middle row in (4) is as follows: after serving the minimum156
interest rate of the first group, the insurance company aims at endowing the second group with an157
identical minimum interest rate g1 provided there is enough capital left for this. When this is not the158
case, the second group obtains the remainder W(T)− G1(T) (≥ G2(T)). On the other hand, as long159
as the company’s assets are sufficient to distribute some bonus (third row), group 2 will likely be160
compensated for its lower guaranteed payoff by receiving a higher participation coefficient.5161






4 An alternative rule uses the weights αi/ (α1 + α2), i = 1, 2, so that the splitting rule is decided by the groups’ initial
contributions. Choosing this alternative could, if only one group survives until time T, result in the equity holders receiving
the remaining assets after the insurer has served the group still existent.
5 It may happen in (4) that the payoff in the third row is smaller than that in the middle one, corresponding to a lower assets’
value. However, this fairly rare event does not result in a contradiction since it is down to the insurer to decide to what
extent the goal of achieving equal rates of return shall be pursued.
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where163
ζ+i = Gi(T) + δi max {αiW(T)− Gi(T), 0} , (6)
is the guaranteed payment plus the regular bonus the insurance company aims at delivering164
to the group of policyholders i. The amount D(T) represents then the excess (deficit) of the165
assets above (below) the target payments to both groups. If W(T) ≥ max {G1(T)/α1, G2(T)/α2},166
then D(T) ≥ 0. If min {G1(T)/α1, G2(T)/α2} < W(T) < max {G1(T)/α1, G2(T)/α2}, the sign167
















i 1{D(T)≥0} + ζ
−
i 1{D(T)<0}. (8)
As long as D(T) ≥ 0, the firm can serve both groups with their regular bonuses. If, however, D(T) < 0,170
the assets of the insurer are insufficient to generate such payments. We assume then that the group171
with the higher value of Gi(T)/αi obtains only the guaranteed payment, while the other group seizes172
the remaining assets’ value which is larger than the guaranteed payment, but smaller than the payoff173
including the regular bonus.6174
Case 2. We assume that the policies from the first and second group expire at time T1, respectively175
time T2, and, without loss of generality, let T2 > T1. The minimum guaranteed rates are set to be equal,176
i.e. g1 = g2 =: g. The guaranteed payoffs are now Gi(Ti) = Ni(Ti)l(0)egTi , i = 1, 2.177
In order to define the outstanding liabilities Li(Tj), i = 1, 2, j = 1, 2, we need the market178
value V2(T1) at the earliest maturity T1 of the guaranteed payoff paid at T2 to the second group.179
The exact specification of V2(T1) will be given in Section 4. Define then V(T1) := G1(T1) + V2(T1) the180
market value at T1 of the insurer’s liabilities, including the immediate guaranteed payment to the181
first group and the market value of future liabilities for the second group. A premature default event182
may occur at time T1 when W(T1) < V(T1) and N1(T1) > 0. In this case, we assume that group 1183
will accept less than G1(T1) as insurance benefit, so that an equal treatment of both groups can be184
achieved. In other words, the two groups of policyholders have the same claiming priority in the case185
of bankruptcy. More specifically, the global payment made to surviving policyholders of the first group186
at T1 is defined by187
6 Through this way of modelling of the outstanding liabilities, it could happen that the payments to the equity holders
decrease or even vanish, although the assets’ value increases at the same time. The rationale behind this circumstance is
that when the assets pertaining to the policyholders as a whole create some surplus over the minimum guarantees, the
insurer’s primary goal is to provide them with their regular bonuses, if possible. Some alternative modelling methods apply
if the insurance company wants to calculate the possible bonus payments to the different stakeholders based on their initial
contributions. In this case, the definition of ζi(T), i = 1, 2, needs to take into account that only (α1 + α2)W(0) is provided
by the policyholders of the two groups at time 0 leading to a modification of (5) and (7). However, for the sake of brevity, we
examine only the case described before.





W(T1) if W(T1) < V(T1)





if V(T1)α1+α2 < W(T1)
. (9)
Here, the target regular payment to the first group ζ+1 , defined as in (6) with T replaced by T1, may be188
so high that the second group could not be served with the notional guaranteed amount V2(T1). In189
this case, only the amount W(T1)−V2(T1) (> G1(T1)) is available to the policyholders in group 1, so190
that the remaining assets match the market value of the guaranteed payoff to the second group.191
To define the outstanding liability for group 2, we need to distinguish whether there is default at192





If there is no default at T1, i.e. when W(T1) ≥ V(T1) or when N1(T1) = 0, the contract payoff for the194
second group becomes due at time T2 and is given by195




W ′(T2) if W ′(T2) < G2(T2)
G2(T2) if G2(T2) ≤W ′(T2) ≤ G2(T2)α′2
G2(T2) + δ2 (α′2W
′(T2)− G2(T2)) if G2(T2)α′2 < W
′(T2)
, (12)
where α′2 = α2/ (1− α1) and W ′(T2) is the assets’ value at T2 taking into account the previous outflows197
to the policyholders of the first group. The exact specification of W ′(T2) will be given in Section 4.198
Note also that the events in the indicators in (10) and (11) are disjoint, so only one benefit will be paid199
to the second group either at T1 or T2.200
2.2. Modelling Insurance and Financial Risk201
In this section, we follow and adapt Bacinello et al. (2018) to our situation.202
The insurance risk is made up of the hedgeable (also called diversifiable or unsystematic) part,203
which is likely to tail off once the portfolio of all policyholders of the heterogeneous groups is204
sufficiently large, and the systematic (or unhedgeable) part. The latter, called longevity risk, cannot be205
diversified away through pooling and affects all contracts equally by entailing the misestimation of206
the decline in mortality rates. An introduction to longevity risk is given in e.g. Barrieu et al. (2012);207
Biffis (2005) and Biffis et al. (2010) cover the stochastic modelling of longevity risk.208
We select a risk neutral probability measure Q for pricing purposes.7 Furthermore, we let τ ji209
be the residual lifetime of the j-th policyholder, j = 1, . . . , Ni(0), of group i, i = 1, 2. The following210
assumptions will remain valid throughout the paper.211
Assumption 1. There exists a positive random variable ∆, measurable with respect to the σ-algebra containing212
the information available to market participants at time T in Case 1, and T1 in Case 2, such that213
7 By assuming that the markets are arbitrage-free, such a probability measure Q exists. As insurance markets are incomplete,
the measure Q is chosen among infinitely many equivalent martingale measures.













































for any tji ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, j = 1, . . . , Ni(0), where mi is a deterministic force of mortality depending on the initial214
age xi of group i, non-negative, continuous, and satisfying
∫ +∞
0 mi(v)dv = +∞.215
Then, conditionally on ∆, the residual lifetimes τ ji , i = 1, 2, j = 1, . . . , Ni(0), are independent.216
The random variable ∆ can be thought of as a systematic risk factor whose effect is to rescale the217
deterministic forces of mortality mi, i = 1, 2, by a random percentage. It is assumed to be the same218
for both groups of policyholders, so that all biometric differences between them stem from the219
deterministic forces of mortality, that are already equipped with safety margins, as will be specified in220
Section 4. Moreover, the fact that ∆ is assumed to be part of the information available at the earliest221
maturity date means that its true value is unveiled within the (first) contract maturity, whereas today222
the market participants can merely anticipate the impact of the systematic risk since the rescaling223
amount is unknown at the valuation date 0. This greatly simplified circumstance is in some way224
acceptable by the fact that the insurer collects a vast quantity of demographic information from the225
examined and similar portfolios over the years, whose analysis can reveal the actual character of ∆. As226
we see in Section 4, we actually exploit this property only in Case 2.227
The t-years survival probability for an individual belonging to group i, i = 1, 2, can be derived228
from Assumption 1 through229













for t ≥ 0 and j = 1, . . . , Ni(0). In the following, we also set230





for yi ≥ xi, i = 1, 2, and u ≥ 0, so that in particular, for 0 ≤ t ≤ s, we obtain a231
‘deterministic’ survival probability s−t p∗xi+t = e
−
∫ s
t mi(v)dv. Further, conditional on ∆, we232






for i = 1, 2 and t ≥ 0.233
Concerning the modelling of the financial risk, we presume that it is entirely driven by the234
randomness of the assets which is captured by the next important assumption.235
Assumption 2. At time t ≥ 0, the assets’ value W(t) is defined by W(t) = W(0)eR(0,t), where R(0, t)236
is the random assets’ log-return over [0, t]. This return is independent of ∆ and the residual237
lifetimes τ ji , i = 1, 2, j = 1, . . . , Ni(0).238
The possibility of having an interest risk component, that can be implemented by introducing239
stochastic interest rates, is ignored in this paper whereby the market short rate, denoted by r, is240
supposed to be constant.241
3. Valuation242
We denote by Vi the initial market value of the outstanding liabilities for group i, i = 1, 2. The243
contracts issued by the insurer are fair if the following conditions hold:244
Version January 9, 2021 submitted to Risks 9 of 20
V1 = L1(0), V2 = L2(0). (16)
In other words, the initial market value of the claim of group i, i = 1, 2, coincides with its initial245
investment Li(0) = αiW(0). Note that, if the equations in (16) hold, then fairness is guaranteed246
for equity holders as well. Economically, we can interpret these conditions as constraints on the247
participation coefficients δi, i = 1, 2. Nevertheless, it may happen that (16) implies participation248
coefficients that exceed 100% because there is a chance that the benefits of the customers are excessively249
low. Moreover, negative coefficients are also possible to compensate for too high benefits. We only250
consider fair contracts for which δi ∈ [0, 1], i = 1, 2.251
Armed with the pricing measure Q, we can calculate Vi, i = 1, 2. For Case 1, entailing T as the252





, i = 1, 2. (17)






Due to the possible premature deficit of the insurer at the earlier maturity T1, the outstanding payoff255
to group 2 is paid out either at T1 or at the regular maturity T2. Then256
V2 = EQ
[




We conduct some numerical analyses to understand the relative size of participation rates for the258
heterogeneous customers and which group of policyholders is better or worse off when pooling them259
together. To serve this purpose, we compute for Cases 1 and 2260
• firstly, the fair participation rates δ∗i , i = 1, 2, under the pricing measure Q;261
• secondly, the annual certainty equivalent log-returns of the life insurance contracts under the262
real world measure P, henceforth just certainty equivalent returns, denoted by Ci, i = 1, 2, based263
on the fair participation rates δ∗i .
8
264

















Depending on different pooling schemes, we can figure out, based on Ci, i = 1, 2, how attractive our266
life insurance policies are against alternative investments. Through comparing C1 and C2, we can also267
identify which group benefits more from a certain pooling scheme.268
Concerning the modelling of the insurance risk under the pricing measure Q, we assume269
Gompertz’s law, i.e. mi(t) = λic
xi+t










for 0 ≤ t ≤ s. Furthermore, we suppose that ∆ follows a Gamma distribution Γ(β, θ)271
8 To calculate δ∗i , i = 1, 2, we solve numerically the equations in (16) with Vi , i = 1, 2, given by (17) for Case 1, and (18) and (19)
for Case 2. Due to the complicated structure of the outstanding liabilities, the computation of Vi , i = 1, 2, is based on a
standard Monte Carlo simulation encompassing 100 000 draws. The calculation of Ci , i = 1, 2, is again based on the Monte
Carlo method.
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with VarQ (∆) = 0.1 and EQ [∆] ∈ {0.4, 0.8, 1}. The latter stipulation provides the possibility to272
integrate various degrees of the insurer’s conservativeness into the pricing of the contracts. Specifically,273
lower values of EQ [∆] are associated with higher risk premiums or, put it another way, with increasing274
conservativeness of the company concerning longevity risk.275
The financial risk merely depends on the stochastic log-return of the assets R(0, t), that is assumed276
to be normally distributed under Q with mean (r− σ2/2)t and standard deviation σ
√
t, where σ is the277
assets’ volatility.278
Assumption 1 shall hold under P as well, with the same rescaling random variable ∆ and279
with deterministic forces of mortality m̃i, i = 1, 2. However, as the considered contracts are pure280
endowments, we have, for all t ≥ 0,281













=: t p̃xi , i = 1, 2. (21)
In other words, the risk neutral survival probability contains a safety loading. To achieve (21),282
we set m̃i = mi/γ, i = 1, 2, where γ < 1, and assume that the distribution of ∆ under P283
is Gamma with the same variance as under Q, i.e. VarP (∆) = VarQ (∆) = 0.1, but with284
expectation EP [∆] = 1. Under P, the distribution of the number of surviving policyholders at285










m̃i(v)dv for yi ≥ xi, i = 1, 2,286






, where µ is the expected287
instantaneous rate of return of the assets. Then, Assumption 2 shall hold under P as well.288
Subsequently, Table 1 summarizes the assumed values for the parameters that are not case-specific289
and valid in all of the following numerical analyses.290
Symbol Description Value
l(0) Initial contribution of a single policyholder 35
e(0) Equity holders’ share of initial assets 0.3
x1 (= x2) Initial age of policyholders 40
λ1 (= λ2) Age independent Gompertz parameter 2.6743 · 10−5
c1 (= c2) Age dependent Gompertz parameter 1.098
β Shape parameter of ∆ under Q {1.6, 6.4, 10}
θ Scale parameter of ∆ under Q {0.25, 0.125, 0.1}
r Risk free short rate 3%
σ Assets’ volatility 15%
µ Assets’ expected instantaneous rate of return 5%
γ Adjustment factor to force of mortality 0.9
Table 1. Non case-specific parameters for numerical analyses.
The two values for the Gompertz parameters given in Table 1 were obtained by fitting the survival291
probabilities t p∗40 to the corresponding probabilities implied by the projected life table IPS55 in use in292
the Italian annuity market, see Bacinello et al. (2018). Further, combining pairwise the parameters of293
the Gamma distribution given in Table 1 will result in the values of EQ [∆] and VarQ (∆) considered.9294
Results for Case 1. We set T ∈ {12, 25} and consider reasonable choices for the minimum interest295
rate guarantees, g1 = 1.75% and g2 = 1.25%. As previously outlined, a potentially desirable goal of296
an insurer is to provide all policyholders with the same (expected) rate of return regardless of the297
9 The parameters of ∆ ∼ Γ(β, θ) are calculated via EQ [∆] = βθ and VarQ (∆) = βθ2.
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individual minimum interest rate guarantee. Hence, comparing the certainty equivalent returns C1298
and C2 for the two groups in the present case seems particularly interesting. Tables 2 – 4 contain our299
findings for the fair participation rates and the annual certainty equivalent returns.300













C1 C2 C1 C2 C1 C2
1 1 72.42 78.01 76.38 81.60 78.37 83.41
4.22 4.32 4.35 4.44 4.42 4.51
10 10 70.03 75.65 71.32 76.66 71.94 77.14
4.30 4.41 4.35 4.44 4.37 4.46
100 100 70.05 75.68 71.34 76.69 71.96 77.17
4.30 4.41 4.35 4.44 4.37 4.46
1000 1000 70.06 75.68 71.35 76.70 71.97 77.19
4.30 4.41 4.35 4.45 4.37 4.46
100 000 100 000 70.06 75.68 71.35 76.70 71.97 77.18
4.30 4.41 4.35 4.45 4.37 4.46
Table 2. Fair participation rates and certainty equivalent returns for Case 1 with T = 12, different
portfolio sizes with N1(0) = N2(0) and different values of EQ [∆]. All results are in percentage.
From Table 2, we observe the following:301
(2.1) Group 2, endowed with a lower interest rate guarantee, is naturally provided with a higher fair302
participation rate δ∗2 and a perceptibly larger implied certainty equivalent return C2. In order to303
examine the goodness of the contract design in (4), middle row, to achieve similar rates of return304
for different groups of customers, we further carry out the analysis under the assumption that the305
same payout structure of group 1 is applied to group 2 (but still with different guarantees g1 > g2)306
and find that δ∗2 and C2 are even higher. Therefore, if the insurance company aimed at treating307
both groups fairly when the payoff structures are identical, it should assign a much larger fair308
participation rate to the second group than to the first one, resulting in a greater difference309
between C1 and C2. That is why our attempt at designing contracts that potentially provide the310
same rate of return to customers endowed with different minimum interest rate guarantees leads311
to more desirable results.312
(2.2) For any portfolio size, an increase in the longevity risk premium, i.e. lower values for EQ[∆],313
leads to smaller fair participation rates. This is because longevity improvements anticipated314
by the insurer increase the expected number of survivors, and consequently the value of the315
outstanding liabilities. To offset this effect and simultaneously ensure fairness, lower participation316
rates are offered. The same observation holds true for the certainty equivalent returns of the317
policyholders under the physical measure P. The reason for this is due to the smaller participation318
rates δ∗i , i = 1, 2, since a greater degree of conservativeness harms the customers’ benefits.319
(2.3) For the exceptional case where N1(0) = N2(0) = 1, the fair participation rates are considerably320
higher than those obtained with larger portfolio sizes due to the sizeable extinction probability321
of the groups and the fact that the equity holders seize all the assets pertaining to the extinct322
group(s). As a compensation, the policyholders need to be served with substantially larger323
participation rates.324
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(2.4) It seems that, with a very small portfolio size, e.g. Ni(0) = 10, i = 1, 2, the portfolio is already325
well-diversified, i.e. the expected impact of the systematic part of the biometric risk is the only326
component still playing a role, since similar results are achieved as, e.g. when Ni(0) = 100 000.327
(2.5) It is notable that all certainty equivalent returns lie between the risk free rate of return and the328
expected rate of return of the assets under P, i.e. Ci ∈ (r, µ) = (0.03, 0.05), i = 1, 2. It is true that329
our life insurance policies cannot beat the pure investment into the assets due to the guaranteed330
interest rate, although the values obtained are much closer to µ than to r. Nevertheless, the331
included guarantees of the insurance products make them much less risky and are crucial for332
many potential customers when comparing different investment opportunities.333













C1 C2 C1 C2 C1 C2
10 1000 68.51 74.59 69.80 75.66 70.44 76.18
4.26 4.38 4.31 4.42 4.33 4.44
100 100 000 68.55 74.57 69.91 75.64 70.56 76.15
4.26 4.37 4.31 4.41 4.33 4.43
1000 100 71.34 76.75 72.57 77.71 73.16 78.18
4.33 4.44 4.38 4.47 4.40 4.49
100 000 10 71.63 77.01 72.84 77.96 73.43 78.43
4.34 4.44 4.38 4.48 4.40 4.50
Table 3. Fair participation rates and certainty equivalent returns for Case 1 with T = 12, different
portfolio sizes with N1(0) 6= N2(0) and different values of EQ [∆]. All results are in percentage.
Table 3 displays the effect of assuming different group sizes. Our findings are listed below:334
(3.1) We observe that policyholders in the larger group obtain relatively higher fair participation335
rates δ∗i , i = 1, 2, and consequently mostly also relatively higher certainty equivalent returns Ci336
on their investments when comparing them with the corresponding numbers from Table 2.337
(3.2) For the first group, an increase in N1(0) leads to an increase in δ∗1 and C1 in general, independently338
of the size of the other group, while, for the second group, the opposite relations apply. We can339
conclude that, if there are only a few policyholders holding a lower individual guarantee than340
the rest, their participation in the surplus distribution must be very high to ensure fair contracts,341
especially if they represent a clear minority. Another related interesting fact is that a sudden342
spread within the values for δ∗i and Ci, i = 1, 2, occurs as soon as the size ratio between the two343
groups shifts.344
Figure 1 clearly illustrates the fact described in Remark (3.2) using the example where EQ [∆] = 0.8. In345
the two plots, we can further detect that the corresponding numbers from Table 2 lie in-between the346
ones from Table 3.347
Table 4 completes Case 1 by addressing the influence of the maturity date. We observe that a longer348
contract duration increases both the fair participation rates δ∗i , i = 1, 2, and the certainty equivalent349
returns Ci compared to Table 3. Moving T from 12 to 25 years implies that less policyholders are350
expected to survive the maturity date, consequently a lower aggregated guaranteed payment needs to351
be provided by the insurer. Due to the fair contract principles, the insurer is then able to provide larger352
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(a) Group 1. (b) Group 2.
Figure 1. Case 1: fair participation rates in percentage when EQ[∆] = 0.8. Triangles show rates from
Table 3 for given combinations of group sizes. Circles additionally show rates from Table 2 when group
sizes fulfil N2(0) = N1(0) = 10, 100, 1000, 100 000 (left) and N1(0) = N2(0) = 1000, 100 000, 100, 10
(right).













C1 C2 C1 C2 C1 C2
10 1000 82.45 88.11 84.59 89.59 85.56 90.24
4.61 4.72 4.67 4.77 4.69 4.79
100 100 000 82.56 88.09 84.80 89.57 85.81 90.22
4.61 4.72 4.67 4.77 4.70 4.79
1000 100 85.80 90.45 87.58 91.58 88.39 92.09
4.69 4.78 4.74 4.82 4.76 4.83
100 000 10 86.13 90.73 87.87 91.84 88.66 92.33
4.69 4.79 4.74 4.82 4.76 4.84
Table 4. Fair participation rates and certainty equivalent returns for Case 1 with T = 25, different
portfolio sizes with N1(0) 6= N2(0) and different values of EQ [∆]. All results are in percentage.
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participation rates for a longer contract maturity. Again, a high participation in the surplus results in a353
high certainty equivalent return.354
Results for Case 2. In this case, the maturity dates of the groups’ policies differ. The quantity V2(T1) in355








where EQT1 [·] denotes the expectation under Q conditional on information available at time T1.357
Since G2(T2) = N2(T2)l(0)egT2 is proportional to N2(T2), and by exploiting Assumptions 1 and 2358
of Section 2.2, we can write (22) as359







Furthermore, the remaining assets’ value W ′(T2) is defined as360
W ′(T2) = (W(T1)− L1(T1)) eR(T1,T2), (24)





(T2 − T1) and variance σ2(T2 − T1) under Q.10362
As the first group is entirely dealt with at the earlier maturity T1, its certainty equivalent return is363
defined as in (20). On the contrary, the second group receives a payout either at the regular maturity T2,364
or at T1 if the insurance company is then insolvent. To be able to incorporate this contingency into365
the computation of C2, we assume that the possible payment L2(T1) is invested into the riskless asset366












The number of surviving policyholders of the second group is now needed at both368
times T1 and T2. Consequently, under Q and conditional on ∆ and N2(T1), we369









Concerning the case-specific parameters, we stipulate that (T1, T2) ∈ {(10, 12), (12, 25)}371
and g = 1.25%. Tables 5 – 7 show our values for δ∗i and Ci, i = 1, 2, for this second case.372
Table 5 delivers the fair participation rates and certainty equivalent returns for the two373
heterogeneous and equal-sized groups of policyholders with T1 = 10 and T2 = 12. We can establish374
the following:375
(5.1) One of the main questions is: why are fair participation coefficients for the second group so much376
smaller compared to group 1, even though in Case 1 it was seen that a longer duration leads377
to higher fair participation rates? A possible explanation is the fact that only a portion of the378
assets α1W(T1) pertaining to the first group at T1, is paid out to its policyholders if the insurer is379
able to achieve a surplus. As a consequence, group 2 profits from the residual amount staying in380




(T2 − T1), σ2(T2 − T1)
)
.
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C1 C2 C1 C2 C1 C2
1 1 75.52 49.27 78.36 52.07 79.90 53.47
4.26 4.04 4.36 4.16 4.42 4.22
10 10 73.62 47.73 74.51 48.80 74.92 49.32
4.34 4.13 4.37 4.18 4.39 4.20
100 100 73.63 47.74 74.53 48.82 74.95 49.34
4.34 4.13 4.37 4.18 4.39 4.20
1000 1000 73.64 47.74 74.53 48.82 74.96 49.34
4.34 4.13 4.37 4.18 4.39 4.20
100 000 100 000 73.63 47.74 74.53 48.82 74.96 49.35
4.34 4.13 4.37 4.18 4.39 4.20
Table 5. Fair participation rates and certainty equivalent returns for Case 2 with (T1, T2) = (10, 12),
different portfolio sizes with N1(0) = N2(0) and different values of EQ [∆]. All results are in percentage.
the company which boosts the probability of gaining relatively high assets’ values in the future.381
To maintain fairness, a lower δ∗2 is required.382
(5.2) The spread between C1 and C2 is always significantly positive, although it decreases as EQ[∆]383
increases. Clearly, the substantially higher fair participation rates for group 1 play a major role384
here. Nevertheless, these differences are much less relevant than those between δ∗1 and δ
∗
2 .385
Figure 2 illustrates the situation described in (5.1) and shows that obtaining fairness is associated with386
providing the second group with a much smaller participation coefficient.387













C1 C2 C1 C2 C1 C2
10 1000 72.82 53.45 73.65 54.45 74.04 54.94
4.32 4.11 4.35 4.16 4.37 4.19
100 100 000 72.84 53.52 73.71 54.53 74.14 55.02
4.32 4.11 4.35 4.16 4.37 4.19
1000 100 74.30 38.77 75.21 39.88 75.65 40.43
4.36 4.15 4.39 4.20 4.41 4.22
100 000 10 74.45 35.60 75.36 36.68 75.80 37.21
4.36 4.16 4.40 4.20 4.41 4.23
Table 6. Fair participation rates and certainty equivalent returns for Case 2 with (T1, T2) = (10, 12),
different portfolio sizes with N1(0) 6= N2(0) and different values of EQ [∆]. All results are in percentage.
As before, the case when N1(0) 6= N2(0) holds is evaluated for Case 2 and the corresponding388
results are presented in Tables 6 and 7. As far as Table 6 is concerned, two striking features are:389
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(a) Group 1. (b) Group 2.
Figure 2. Case 2: 100 scenarios of the outstanding liability in terms of the participation rate
when EQ[∆] = 0.8 (grey dotted if no default at maturity T1, grey otherwise). Additionally, the mean
(black dashed) and discounted mean (black) of the outstanding liability, and the premium (black dotted)
are shown.
(6.1) The fair participation rates δ∗i , i = 1, 2, grow with Ni(0). Therefore, it is surprising that, unlike390
the certainty equivalent return C1 of the first group, C2 declines as the second group size N2(0)391
increases (as in Table 3 where this also holds for δ∗2 ). Yet, this finding reinforces the fact that low392
values of δ∗2 , when N2(0) is small, are necessary.393
(6.2) The most remarkable feature is given by the variation in the values of δ∗2 for a given mortality394
pricing assumption when changing the composition of the portfolio (in particular, when395
comparing cases with N1(0) < N2(0) to cases with N1(0) > N2(0)).396
To get a better understanding of Remark (6.2), a key example is shown in Figure 3 where, on the397
left-hand side, δ∗2 is plotted against numbers of policyholders in group 1. An increase in N1(0) results398
in a remarkable decrease of the participation coefficient δ∗2 . The adjoining graph in Figure 3 displays,399
inter alia, the development of the assets’ value W ′(T2) at time T2, which is relevant for the contract400
payoff of the second group if the insurer is solvent at T1. The rise of W ′(T2) stems from the fact401
that the two quantities W(T1) and L1(T1) occurring in (24) evolve differently, i.e. W(T1) grows faster402
than L1(T1). Thus, the second group would benefit from a bigger size of group 1 and consequently δ∗2403
needs to be lowered.404
As far as Table 7 is concerned, we further observe the following:405
(7.1) Compared to Remark (6.2), the fair participation rate of the second group seems to smooth out406
over time within one longevity pricing assumption since the fluctuations between the varying407
pooling schemes subside. Specifically, δ∗2 goes down if N2(0)/N1(0) is large (unlike Table 4 when408
compared to Table 3) and it goes up if N2(0)/N1(0) is small (as in Table 4 when compared to409
Table 3). Looking at the values of δ∗1 , the same pattern is observed, i.e. a high N2(0)/N1(0) results410
in lower fair participation coefficients and a low N2(0)/N1(0) leads to (much) higher ones.411
(7.2) Concerning the certainty equivalent returns, those of group 1 behave quite as expected, i.e. for412
the first two pooling schemes (low δ∗1 ), smaller figures of C1 are obtained and for the last two413
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Figure 3. Case 2: fair participation rate δ∗2 in percentage (left), assets’ and liability’s values (right) in
terms of the size of the first group when N2(0) = 3000 and EQ[∆] = 0.8. In the right-hand plot, total
assets’ value W(T1) at T1 (dark grey), outstanding liability for the first group L1(T1) at T1 (light grey)
and assets’ value W ′(T2) at T2 (black) are shown.













C1 C2 C1 C2 C1 C2
10 1000 70.61 51.90 71.29 53.75 71.66 54.62
4.25 4.39 4.27 4.48 4.29 4.52
100 100 000 70.62 51.99 71.35 53.83 71.75 54.71
4.25 4.39 4.28 4.48 4.29 4.52
1000 100 77.35 39.07 78.24 41.06 78.67 42.01
4.44 4.33 4.47 4.43 4.48 4.48
100 000 10 78.19 36.59 79.13 38.59 79.58 39.52
4.46 4.33 4.49 4.43 4.51 4.47
Table 7. Fair participation rates and certainty equivalent returns for Case 2 with (T1, T2) = (12, 25),
different portfolio sizes with N1(0) 6= N2(0) and different values of EQ [∆]. All results are in percentage.
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combinations (high δ∗1 ), larger values occur, compared to Table 6. By contrast, the relevant values414
of C2 are always significantly higher than their counterparts in the previous table. A possible415
reason for that is our assumption made in the specific definition of this quantity given in (25),416
namely that the premature payoff to the second group conditioned by a default event at time T1417
is invested into the riskless asset until T2.418
5. Concluding Remarks419
Participating life insurance products with minimum guarantees still represent a large portion420
of the contract portfolios of many life insurers. Due to the challenges these products have had to421
face in the recent past, such as the ongoing low interest rate environment, it is of special importance422
to adequately assess the financial standing of the firms. For this purpose, we seek to establish a423
model which strives to include several possible influencing factors. In addition to the introduction of424
a financial risk component, i.e. the uncertainty about future developments of the assets, and of the425
default risk, i.e. the chance of a distress of the company, we also integrate the longevity risk that is426
specifically crucial for life insurers. Especially in the light of the fact that people steadily get older on427
average and because of our focus on products cashing out only the claims of surviving policyholders,428
like pure endowments, it is reasonable to enhance our exploration by taking this risk into account. In429
this way, we can also study the effects of different longevity pricing assumptions made by the insurance430
company that reflect its degree of conservativeness. Furthermore, we aim to incorporate an often431
unconsidered circumstance, namely that customers and their contracts are (partially) heterogeneous.432
Therefore, we simplistically divide them into two homogeneous group. As a consequence, crucial433
issues, such as the impact of the usually high guarantees of old policyholders on the payout structures434
of new customers who are endowed with much lower guaranteed interest rates, can be surveyed.435
After modelling the liabilities, we value them on a market-consistent basis leading to the feasibility436
of a fair contract analysis. With the aid of such an analysis, it is possible to determine appropriate437
policy parameters and in particular the participation rates. Building on the outcomes, we are also438
able to compute other interesting key figures, like the physical returns for the diverse insured persons.439
Eventually, we detect the effects of the different elements included in the model on the life insurer’s440
and the policyholders’ positions. Our main findings are listed in the following overview:441
• If the insurer decides to heavily load risk premiums for the systematic part of the insurance risk,442
lower fair participation rates result. This in turn also hits the customers’ returns, particularly if443
the presumptions on the longevity risk are very prudent.444
• Maintaining usual practised participation rates of∼ 80− 100% (often prescribed by law) can give445
rise to severe financial problems for the insurer, as certain portfolio and parameter combinations446
actually imply smaller participation coefficients ensuring the fairness of the contracts.447
• If the two groups differ exclusively in the promised minimum interest rate guarantee provided448
by the insurer (Case 1), the group endowed with the lower minimum interest rate guarantee449
receives a larger fair participation rate. This increase is intensified if the insurance company does450
not explicitly aim to provide similar returns to all policyholders. Consequently, the difference451
between the actual returns widens as well. Thus, the proposed definition of the payoff structure452
for this case turns out to be an option the insurer can exploit in order to protect the customers453
and advance the desirable goal of achieving similar returns for everyone.454
• In Case 1, another observation leads to the insight that, if there are only a few policyholders455
holding a lower individual guarantee than the rest, their participation in the surplus sharing456
must be really high to ensure fair contracts, especially if they represent a clear minority.457
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• If the two groups differ exclusively in the contract maturity date (Case 2), the fair participation458
rate for the group with the longer contract duration is much lower, and so is the resulting actual459
return, although on a considerably smaller scale.460
• In Case 2, the group with the longer contract duration receives a remarkably low fair participation461
rate if it outnumbers the members of the other group.462
While the paper at hand is not able to capture every facet, in the given context, of a modern insurance463
company acting in an open market economy, we think that our setup, paired with the wide numerical464
analyses and related findings, helps to get a better understanding of the interaction between the several465
influencing variables and to assess more thoroughly possibly occurring situations with their inherent466
chances.467
Potential aspects of future research can include, for instance, the study of alternative splitting468
rules in the event of bankruptcy, the allowance for a stochastic short rate model, the combination of469
different elements of heterogeneity, or the adoption of more sophisticated assumptions concerning the470
systematic biometric risk.471
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